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Rumors of the Death of Emotional Intelligence in 




In the first of two articles presenting the case for emotional intelligence in a point-
counterpoint exchange, we present a brief summary of research in the field, and rebut 
arguments against the construct presented in this issue.  We identify three streams of 
research: (1) a four-branch abilities test based on the model of emotional intelligence 
defined in Mayer and Salovey (1997); (2) self-report instruments based on the Mayer-
Salovey model; and (3) commercially available tests that go beyond the Mayer-Salovey 
definition.  In response to the criticisms of the construct, we argue that the protagonists 
have not distinguished adequately between the streams, and have inappropriately 
characterized emotional intelligence as a variant of social intelligence.  More 
significantly, two of the critical authors assert incorrectly that emotional intelligence 
research is driven by a utopian political agenda, rather than scientific interest.  We argue, 
on the contrary, that emotional intelligence research is grounded in recent scientific 
advances in the study of emotion; specifically regarding the role emotion plays in 
organizational behavior.  We conclude that emotional intelligence is attracting deserved 
continuing research interest as an individual difference variable in organizational 
behavior related to the way members perceive, understand, and manage their emotions. 
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Rumors of the Death of Emotional Intelligence in 
Organizational Behavior are Vastly Exaggerated 
The case for emotional intelligence is presented in two articles.  In this, the first of 
these, we deal specifically with the points raised by Landy, Locke, and Conte in the 
preceding three articles critical of the conceptualization and measurement of emotional 
intelligence.  Indeed, if one were to read the three critical articles, especially Landy’s and 
Locke’s, one could be excused for concluding that emotional intelligence is not viable as 
a scientific construct, and that organizational researchers ought to stop wasting their time 
in researching the construct.  In other words, emotional intelligence is dead.  We argue in 
this article that, far from being moribund, emotional intelligence is an exciting and 
developing area of research in organizational behavior, and a key component of the 
current burgeoning interest in emotions in organizational settings (Ashkanasy & Daus, 
2002, Ashkanasy, Härtel, & Daus, 2002).  At the same time, we also warn that emotional 
intelligence researchers need to be careful that they fully understand the construct, and 
also show appropriate levels of circumspection in their research endeavors.  In the second 
of the two articles in defense of emotional intelligence (Daus & Ashkanasy, this issue), 
we take our arguments a step further, and provide an up-to-date and cogent summary of 
current research in work settings based on the four-branch model of emotional 
intelligence (as defined in Salovey & Mayer, 1997). Our hope is that this article will 
serve to guide future research in a blossoming new field in organizational behavior and 
industrial/organizational psychology. 
The present article is arranged into three sections.  In the first, we provide a brief 
history of the emotional intelligence construct, and introduce the three main streams of 
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research in the field.  We then summarize the points raised by the protagonists, and 
discuss the authors’ criticisms within the context of the more recent literature on the 
psychology of emotions, emotional intelligence, and emotions in organizations. In the 
third and final section, we discuss in general the role of emotional intelligence research in 
organizational behavior research, and in particular within the context of the study of 
emotion in organizations. 
Models of emotional intelligence 
Although the term ‘emotional intelligence’ was used occasionally in the general 
literature beginning in the 1960’s (Payne, 1986), the first definitive application of the 
term appeared in a doctoral dissertation by Wayne Payne (1986).  Payne, however, did 
not publish his theory, so the article published in 1990 by Salovey and Mayer (1990) is 
generally regarded as the wellspring of thought on this topic.  (A second 1990 article, by 
Mayer, DiPaolo, and Salovey, also introduced the construct but in a more restricted 
sense, and is less well known.)  In particular, Salovey and Mayer (1990) provided the 
initial definition of the construct in terms of an individual’s ability to perceive emotion in 
self and others, to understand emotion, and then to manage emotion in self and others.  
Shortly thereafter, New York Times social science journalist Daniel Goleman, who was 
researching for a book on ‘emotional literacy’ in education, came across Mayer and 
Salovey’s work, and decided to rename his book Emotional intelligence: Why it can 
matter more than IQ, which was published in 1995.  It is now a matter of history that this 
became a bestseller, including a Time Magazine cover feature (Gibbs, 1995), and brought 
emotional intelligence to the forefront of public attention.  Goleman’s book, in turn, came 
to the attention of a young doctoral graduate, Reuven Bar-On, who had recently 
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completed his dissertation on psychological well-being.  Bar-On had not heard of 
emotional intelligence until he read Goleman’s book, but quickly recognized the potential 
of the measure he had developed for his dissertation work, and rebadged his scales as the 
EQ-i, a multidimensional questionnaire measure of emotional intelligence, now marketed 
and distributed by Multi-Health Systems (Bar-On, 1997). This was followed by a 
veritable flurry of assorted measures, including Goleman’s Emotional Competency Index 
(ECI; Sala, 2002), a proprietary instrument, developed within the Hay Group, and 
scholarly measures based on Mayer and Salovey (1997) by Jordan, Ashkanasy, Härtel, & 
Hooper (2002), Schutte et al. (1998), and Wong and Law (2002).  In the meantime, 
Mayer and Salovey (1997) continued to develop their model of emotional intelligence, 
which they recast in terms of four ‘branches’: (1) perception of emotion (in self and 
others); (2) assimilation of emotion to facilitate thought; (3) understanding of emotion; 
and (4) managing and regulating emotion in self and others.  This model was 
operationalized as an “abilities measure” of emotional intelligence in the tradition of 
measures of intellectual intelligence (i.e., answers can be right or wrong) called the 
MSCEIT (Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test; Mayer, Salovey, & 
Caruso, 2002; see our second article, Daus & Ashkanasy, this issue, for a more 
comprehensive overview of the psychometric development of the ability measure of EI). 
In essence, three streams comprise the set of emotional intelligence research, and 
associated measures. Stream 1 is based on the four-branch abilities model, proposed by 
Mayer and Salovey (1997), and measured using the MSCEIT.  Stream 2 encompasses 
various self- and peer-report measures based on the Mayer-Salovey representation (e.g., 
Jordan, et al., 2002; Schutte et al., 1998; Wong & Law, 2002).  Stream 3 comprises 
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expanded models of emotional intelligence that encompass components not included in 
Salovey and Mayer’s definition, and are represented by the EQ-i and the ECI (see Conte, 
this issue, for more details and criticism of Stream 1 and 3 measures). 
Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso (2000a,b), in reviewing the various measures of 
emotional intelligence characterized the Stream 3 models as “mixed”, insofar as they 
comprise a mixture of personality-type items and behavioral preferences.  In this 
instance, McRae (2000) illustrated how the Stream 3 models of emotional intelligence 
overlap with more traditional measures of personality. The Bar-On and ECI measures, in 
particular, include aspects of personality and social competence that go well beyond the 
bounds of the original definitions given by Salovey and Mayer (1990) and Mayer and 
Salovey (1997). Moreover, questionnaire measures did not in general fare well in early 
empirical evaluations that focused on their reliability and psychometric properties  (e.g., 
Davies, Stankov, & Roberts, 1998), although more recent studies have suggested that the 
scales are much improved (e.g., Conte in this issue). 
More particularly, the various emotional intelligence measures, especially 
Stream 3 measures like the Bar-On scale and the ECI, have proved extremely popular in 
management consultation applications.  Like measures themselves, claims for the 
management consulting applications of emotional intelligence have often extended far 
beyond what Salovey and Mayer (1990) envisaged.  Goleman (2000; see also Goleman, 
McKee, & Boyatzis, 2002), for example, subsequently developed his initial broad 
conceptualization of emotional intelligence into a comprehensive model of organization 
management and leadership (see Locke, this issue, for discussion and criticism of the 
Goleman leadership model).  The net result is that public and commercial perceptions of 
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the emotional intelligence construct are often at variance with the definitions of the 
construct given by its originators, Mayer and Salovey. 
The corollary of the foregoing discussion is that we actually agree with many of 
the points raised by Landy and Locke in their criticisms of emotional intelligence.  
Indeed, we made it “crystal clear” in our summary (Daus & Ashkanasy, 2003) of the 
SIOP “Great Debate” on this topic (DeNisi, 2003) that “we do not endorse a Goleman 
(1995) or Bar-On (1997) type of approach to studying emotional intelligence in the 
workplace” (p. 69). At the same time, we do not wish to disparage practitioners who wish 
to use these and other measures either as a consulting tool, nor do we wish to discourage 
researchers who wish to study the measures in applied settings.  Nonetheless, as we stated 
in our 2003 paper, “These models may indeed be useful for organizational development 
and interventions, but they are much too broad in scope, and do not appear to markedly 
differ from traditional personality models or competency models” (Daus & Ashkanasy, p. 
69).  Our point here is to say to practitioners and researchers who wish to use and to 
further develop these measures and concepts, “Go ahead, by all means, but please do not 
confuse them with emotional intelligence.”  In this respect, we acknowledge that 
Goleman prefers to use the term “emotional competency” in his consulting applications 
(i.e., as in the ECI). 
Against this background, we now turn our attention to the case against emotional 
intelligence, as proffered by Landy, Locke, and Conte.  In particular, and consistent with 
Daus and Ashkanasy (2003), we repeat that we are in agreement with many of their 
points of criticism.  Our main issue, however, is that by not sufficiently differentiating 
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among the different models, they run the risk of ‘throwing the baby out with the bath 
water.’ 
Refuting the case against emotion intelligence 
The authors of the critical articles in this issue approach the topic from three quite 
different points of view.  Landy argues that most of the research in support of the 
construct of emotional intelligence lies “outside the scientific tent”, and that the construct 
thus represents a continuation of a long line of discredited research into “social 
intelligences”.  Locke attacks emotional intelligence at its theoretical core, arguing that 
the construct is inadequately defined and even contradictory, and posits further that its 
application, especially in respect to leadership, is hopelessly flawed.  Finally, Conte 
discusses issues in measurement of emotional intelligence, concluding that future users of 
emotional intelligence need to proceed with caution until more data are forthcoming to 
establish the bona fides of the various measures that have been proffered to date.  In the 
following sections, we discuss each of the three critical articles in turn. 
Landy: historical and scientific issues 
Landy’s criticism addresses three broad areas: (1) There is a lack of scientific 
scrutiny of measures of emotional intelligence; (2) the construct is rooted in the 
(discredited) concept of “social intelligence;” and (3) research in emotional intelligence is 
characterized by weak designs that have yet to demonstrate incremental validity over 
traditional models of personality and social/organizational behavior, and it is therefore 
premature to apply the results. 
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On the first point, Landy argues that emotional intelligence has been for the most 
part developed by purveyors of commercial tests, so that critical scientific data, normally 
associated with establishing the validity and psychometric properties of constructs and 
their measures, are simply not available.  Instead, he notes that proponents such as 
Goleman support their ideas with selective anecdotal evidence, not subject to scientific 
scrutiny.  To a large extent, we agree with this criticism.  Goleman (1995, 2000) and 
Goleman et al. (2002) have all too often resorted to anecdotal evidence; and MHS has 
been somewhat secretive in releasing data to researchers, although it must be noted in 
defense of MHS that this is a commercial operation, entitled to protect commercial-in-
confidence archival data.  Nonetheless, we acknowledge that many of these data do 
indeed lie outside the “scientific tent”.  So this is a restriction, but hardly a fatal flaw.  It 
simply means that researchers and commercial test distributors like MHS need to work 
cooperatively so that a sufficient body of research data does come into the ambit of 
scientific research.  In fact, this is occurring, as bona fide researchers (including the 
authors of this article) receive discounted use of the MCEIT for scientific research. 
The result of all this is now being reflected in a steady stream of scientific 
research activity centered on emotional intelligence, and the Mayer-Salovey model in 
particular (see the following article, as well as Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004a,b, for 
the most recent summaries of research based on the four-branch model).  Landy provides 
a bibliographic analysis of studies of emotional intelligence.  We do not want to engage 
in a blow-for-blow argument on these figures, but suffice to note that, at the time of 
writing the present article, a (rather restrictive) keyword search for “emotional 
intelligence” in PsychINFO (1985-present) resulted in 545 hits, including 2 in the 
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Journal of Applied Psychology, 3 in Personnel Psychology, and 1 in Human 
Performance.i  This compares to the total of 4 for these journals counted by Landy about 
six months earlier – not bad considering the highly selective editorial policies of these 
prestigious journals.  (The count for the Journal of Organizational Behavior is 3.)  In 
effect, and as one would expect in a burgeoning field of research, the volume of quality 
research publications is steadily mounting; and this is despite the negative attitudes to 
emotional intelligence research held by many senior scholars in our field – who often 
review for these journals (as represented by the contributors to this issue). 
Landy devoted a considerable number of pages to the proposition that the notion 
of “social intelligence”, rooted in an article penned by Thorndike in 1920, and published 
in the popular Harper’s Magazine (Thorndike, 1920), is invalid.  In fact, this issue seems 
to be lie at the core of Landy’s objection to emotional intelligence as a valid construct.  
The question is, however, whether emotional intelligence research is appropriately 
characterized as a form of social intelligence.  Goleman (1995, 2000) would probably 
agree with this proposition.  But what about Mayer and Salovey?  In fact, Mayer at al. 
(2000) have gone to some lengths to distinguish emotional intelligence from concepts of 
social intelligence.  They argue that emotional intelligence is essentially about emotion.  
In this respect, emotional intelligence is founded in modern understanding of the role of 
emotional circuits in the brain (see Mayer, 2000).  Thus, while emotional intelligence is 
an example of what Mayer and Salovey (in press) refer to as “hot intelligence”, it is 
nevertheless distinct as a construct from the other members of this category, including 
social and spiritual intelligences.  From our own perspective (Ashkanasy & Daus, 2002; 
Ashkanasy, et al., 2002), we see ourselves primarily as scholars of emotion, focusing on 
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the antecedents and consequences of emotion in organizational settings.  Based on our 
training as researchers in psychology, however, it is not surprising to learn therefore that 
we were interested in the role of individual differences in the way that people at work 
deal with their own and others’ emotions.  In this sense, the four-branch model of 
emotional intelligence seems to best address our research and applied needs. 
At the same time, we acknowledge that emotions play a critical role in developing 
and maintaining social relationships (Ashkanasy, 2003) As it turns out, however, 
although different from the notion of social intelligence, emotional intelligence seems to 
be a key ingredient in the process of developing social relationships and working with 
other people in groups (Lopes & Salovey, 2001).  In the context of workgroups, in 
particular, recent research by Jordan and Troth (2004) and Offermann, Bailey, 
Vasilopoulos, Seal, and Sass (2004) has demonstrated that, while intellectual intelligence 
is the pre-eminent predictor of individual work performance, group performance is more 
a function of emotional than intellectual intelligence. 
In summary, there is little to be gained in making comparisons between the 
mainstream of research into emotional intelligence and past attempts to find a workable 
model of social intelligence.  In terms of what Thorndike (1920) meant by his references 
to social intelligence, there seems also to be little point in speculating on his intentions.  
The fact remains that he did write about social intelligence and, as such, caused scholars 
to think about intelligence as a wider phenomenon than previously.  Today’s emotional 
intelligence researchers are continuing that tradition.  It is clearly far too early to 
conclude they will fail just because of fruitless earlier attempts in this field. 
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Landy’s final point concerns the nature of current research in emotional 
intelligence.  He argues that cross-sectional studies of emotional intelligence have added 
little or nothing to the prediction of workplace outcomes above that predicted by 
personality and GMA (and is supported by Conte on this point).  He further notes that 
ambiguity about definitions of emotional intelligence has obfuscated the area even more, 
and that emotional intelligence researchers should focus their efforts on understanding 
leadership and development of positive organizational attitudes and behaviors.  In fact, 
current research in these respects is proceeding vigorously (e.g., se Salovey, Mayer, & 
Caruso, in press).  In the second article in defense of emotional intelligence, we present a 
comprehensive and up-to-date summary and review of research based on the four-branch 
model of emotional intelligence. 
In summary of Landy’s three points of criticism, we feel that they provide an 
unconvincing case for abandoning research into emotional intelligence.  It’s true that 
there has been a measure of debate as the new construct has been developing; but this is a 
healthy process in scientific research (Jordan, Ashkanasy, Härtel, 2003).  It’s true that the 
concept of social intelligence has had a checkered history, but emotional intelligence is a 
distinct concept, grounded in theories of emotion, so there is no reason to imagine that 
emotional intelligence research will flounder similarly.  And it’s also true that there is 
much to be done before we understand fully the nature and effects of emotional 
intelligence.  In this respect, Landy’s suggestions for future research in the field are 
appreciated. 
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Locke: Theoretical underpinning of emotional intelligence 
Locke’s case against emotional intelligence goes much deeper than Landy’s.  
While Landy’s objections deal with the pragmatics of definitions, research, and 
application, Locke seems to have issue with the whole idea; for him, “emotional 
intelligence” seems like an oxymoron. We respond to his case in two parts.  First, we 
proffer that Locke fails to acknowledge more recent trends and research in emotions.  
Second, he does not distinguish between the mixed models of emotional intelligence and 
the four-branch model, which, for the time being at least, remains the only scientifically 
defensible model of emotional intelligence. 
In many ways, Locke’s arguments reflect the reluctance of organizational scholars 
prior to the 1990’s to engage with emotions, as noted by Pekrun and Frese (1992), 
Ashforth and Humphrey (1994), and Weiss and Brief (2002).  From this point of view, 
emotion and affect represent illegitimate areas for research because the world is 
inherently perceived through a cognitive lens, characterized by Ashforth and Humphrey 
as “the norms of rationality” (p. 101).  As Weiss and Brief point out, however, recent 
advances in our understanding of emotion and its effects have now totally discredited this 
view (see also Lane, 2000, for a recent review of the neural bases of emotional 
experience).  This research demonstrates, for instance, that Locke’s point that individuals 
cannot reason with emotion is, in fact, not correct.  While it’s true that the idea of 
separation of mind and body has been a key tenet of scientific philosophy since 
Descartes, this idea has now been superseded.  This is illustrated in a passage from 
Damasio’s (1994) book Descartes Error, where the author describes a poignant example 
of a patient who had suffered damage to a part of his brain associated with emotional 
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experience.  This patient demonstrated high IQ in all the standard tests, and was capable 
of driving his car on icy roads while all around was mayhem.  But, when it came to 
making a simple decision about a date for his next appointment, Damasio’s patient 
proved totally incompetent.  Indeed, despite his high IQ, he was completely unable to live 
an independent life.  Damasio explains this in terms of “somatic states” (or bodily 
feelings) that play an essential role as shapers of cognitive thought processes, especially 
thoughts that involve evaluative comparisons and judgments.  It seems that people do 
indeed reason with emotion.  More recent research on emotions (e.g., see Lane, 2000) has 
further elaborated on this idea. 
Locke also makes the rather surprising allegation that advocates of emotional 
intelligence seem to be motivated by some form of political agenda.  In this sense, 
proponents of emotional intelligence become left-wing advocates of the idea that 
everyone can become intelligent in some way.  Landy also alludes to this notion.  Again, 
this seems to reflect the rigid cognitive-behavioral view that for so many years inhibited 
research into emotion in organizations (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1994).  On the contrary, 
and as we noted above, our own work has been motivated by a desire to understand the 
role of emotion in organizations and work life.  In this respect, from the perspective of 
organizational scholarship, we believe that we (together with emotion researchers around 
the world) are adding a new dimension of understanding to our field.  Nothing in our 
background suggests a Utopian perspective regarding people and their intelligence levels.  
In fact, as academics, we are in favor of rigorous cognitive standards for admittance to 
colleges and graduate programs…hardly the perspective that Landy and Locke accuse us 
of.  We simply see emotional intelligence as an way to explain incremental variance in 
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important organizational outcomes.  We thus reject completely any idea that we are 
running a political agenda. 
Locke devotes a considerable portion of his criticism to the work of Goleman, and 
especially Goleman’s ideas on emotional intelligence and leadership.  This is a point he 
forcefully made at the 2004 meeting of SIOP (Van Rooy, 2004).  Indeed, he has failed to 
distinguish Goleman’s position from ours (Daus & Ashkanasy, 2003; Jordan et al., 2003) 
and that of Mayer and his associates (e. g., Mayer et al., 2004a), both of whom have 
disavowed Goleman’s position. 
The picture that emerges of Locke’s position is that he appears to be ideologically 
wedded to the idea – widespread in the period from the 1950’s to the 1980’s (see Weiss 
& Brief, 2002) – that emotion is an inappropriate subject for serious research by scholars 
of organizational behavior and I/O psychology.  In the end, Locke suggests that a more 
fruitful area for research is “introspection”, which he characterizes as “an important 
human skill”.  This is true, but introspection is not based in emotional processes, as is 
emotional intelligence (see Ashkanasy, Ashton-James, & Jordan, 2004), and is therefore 
quite differentiated from the concept of emotional intelligence. Jordan and Ashkanasy (in 
press), for example, have shown that introspection (which they refer to as emotional self-
awareness) is a predictor of group process performance over and above the effect of 
emotional intelligence. 
In summary of Locke’s position, we reject outright his (and Landy’s) assertion 
that emotional intelligence research is politically motivated.  Moreover, we believe that 
his views are representative of an outmoded model of organizational behavior, where 
there is no place for the study of emotion, nor of the processes that underlie emotion.  We 
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are of the view that modern theories of organizational behavior have moved on from this 
view, as represented in Brief and Weiss’s review published in the 2002 edition of the 
Annual Review of Psychology. 
Conte: Measures of emotional intelligence 
Of the three articles in this issues that are critical of emotional intelligence, 
Conte’s is the most balanced and pragmatic.  Our major criticism of his argument is that 
he fails to give sufficient recognition to the primacy of the Mayer and Salovey (1997) 
definition of emotional intelligence.  As such, he continues to press the view that the 
alternative models proposed by Goleman (Sala, 2002) and Bar-On (1997) are legitimate 
alternatives to the model proposed in Mayer and Salovey (1997).  In this respect, he 
commits the same error as Van Rooy and Viswesvaran (2004) in that he ‘compares 
apples and oranges.’ 
We thus do not dispute the criticisms Conte makes about the ECI and the EQ-i.  
And there is little point is disputing points in respect of the MEIS (an early Stream 3 
measure), which has been superseded by the MSCEIT (currently available in Version 
2.0). Moreover, we feel that he presents an honest evaluation of the MSCEIT, which is 
not without it problems, as acknowledged by its developers (Mayer et al., 2000) and also 
by its critics (e.g., Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002).  The main issue he identifies is 
that there are no ‘objective truths’ on which to base the ‘right answers’ to the MSCEIT 
items.  The MSCEIT is scored in terms either of consensus norms, or is based on average 
scores obtained from a panel of experts.  Clearly, there are problems with both 
approaches, as Conte identifies.  Alternatively, it does not seem to be all that 
unreasonable to presume that a person who answers “angry” in response to an image that 
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is evaluated as a happy face by either method would be scored ‘wrong’.  Thus, while the 
consensus and expert ratings are not strictly and objectively ‘correct’, they can still be 
regarded as reliable indicators, and have proven so in subsequent research (see Mayer et 
al., 2004a) 
The question, therefore, is not so much whether the mechanics of scoring the 
current version of the MSCEIT are correct or not, but whether research can demonstrate 
that the MSCEIT has reliability and validity in field tests.  The latest reviews by the 
scale’s authors suggest that it does (e.g., Mayer et al., 2004a).  Furthermore, as we 
establish in the second of the articles in this issue, the preponderance of data emerging in 
the I/O field appear to be strongly supportive as well. 
Perhaps the most telling point of criticism that Conte makes is that the results of 
the studies he reviewed suggest that measures of emotional intelligence, and in particular 
the Stream 1 measures (especially the MEIS) fail to deliver sufficient incremental 
predictive power over traditional measures of personally, attitude, and behavior.  He thus 
echoes Landy in comparing emotional intelligence to the social intelligence movement of 
the 1920’s and 30’s.  Our research in this respect (see our next article in this issue) would 
seem to offer a more hopeful prognosis for emotional intelligence, especially in 
organizational research. 
In summary of Conte’s position, we can only say that we are largely in agreement 
with his analysis, although we do believe that he may be prematurely pessimistic about 
the incremental explanatory power of emotional intelligence.  On a more positive note, 
Conte, like Landy, offers some helpful advice for future research into emotional 
intelligence.  Issues concerning the dimensionality of emotional intelligence, faking and 
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adverse impact, and cross-cultural differences are all topics that will keep emotional 
intelligence research healthy and vigorous in the foreseeable future. 
Is emotional intelligence in organizational research dead? 
The three critical articles in this issue are in many ways representative of the 
views of a good number of scholars in I/O psychology and organizational behavior.  Our 
summation, however, is that they fail to consider fully the recent scientific work on 
emotions in organizations.  In this respect, some of the most effective criticisms of 
emotional intelligence have come from among the ranks of emotions researchers 
themselves (e.g., Matthews et al., 2002).  Ashton-James (2003), for example, while 
agreeing with the overall theoretical basis of emotional intelligence (as in Ashkanasy et 
al., 2004), has criticized the abilities measures of emotional intelligence on the basis that 
they can do no more than tap respondents’ semantic knowledge about emotion.  For 
Ashton-James, a true measure of emotional intelligence must place respondents into a 
context where they can actually experience the emotions that they are asked to respond 
to. 
More particularly, critics such as Ashton-James (2003) and Matthews et al. (2002) 
recognize, and focus on emotional intelligence as defined by its originators.  This is in 
contrast with the three protagonists in this issue who, in common with many of the lay 
views of emotional intelligence, fail to distinguish between ‘the real thing’ (as defined in 
Mayer and Salovey, 1997) and versions of the construct that have been promulgated by 
(among others) Goleman and Bar-On.  A further overarching flaw in their arguments is 
that they see emotional intelligence as a modern manifestation of social intelligence.  It 
matters little whether or not Thorndike (1920) first coined the term ‘social intelligence.’  
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More importantly Thorndike, as well as contemporary scholars of intelligence (e.g., 
Gardner, 1983; Sternberg, et al., 2000), recognized that a model of intelligence based 
only on intellectual capacity is insufficient to explain human capabilities and behavior in 
real life.  Damasio’s (1994) brain-damaged patient, for example, invariably scored highly 
on IQ tests yet, because of his inability to experience emotion, was found to be incapable 
of executing simple decision tasks others perform routinely. 
For us, the most surprising point of criticism was Locke’s (and to a lesser extent, 
Landy’s) assertion that the emotional intelligence movement is somehow politically 
motivated by egalitarian ideals so that “everyone will, in some form, be equal in 
intelligence to everyone else”.  We feel that this is reflective of a deeper commitment on 
the behalf of Locke to the idea that, somehow, emotion in not an appropriate topic for 
scholarly study and discourse in organization science.  As such, and as we noted earlier, 
Locke seems to be unable to see past the outmoded model of thinking identified by 
Ashforth and Humphrey (1995) and Pekrun and Frese (1992), where explanatory theories 
of behavior in organizations must be expressed solely in terms of cognition and behavior. 
The burgeoning interest in the study of emotions in organizations would seem to 
belie this idea.  Since the publication of Pekrun and Frese (1992) and Ashforth and 
Humphrey (1995), there has been an outpouring of literature dealing with emotions in 
organizational settings, reflected in recent special issues of journals (e.g., Ashkanasy, 
2004; Fisher & Ashkanasy, 2000; Fox & Spector, 2002; Humphrey, 2002; Weiss, 2001, 
2002) and edited books (e.g., Ashkanasy, Härtel, & Zerbe; 2000, Ashkanasy, Zerbe, & 
Härtel; 2002; Fineman, 1993, 2000; Härtel, Zerbe, & Ashkanasy, 2004; Lord, Klimoski, 
& Kanfer, 2002; Payne & Cooper, 2001). The level of interest is so high that Barsade, 
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Brief, & Spataro (2003) have characterized it as an “affective revolution” in the study of 
organizational behavior.  And leading textbooks (e.g., Robbins, 2005) now include 
substantial coverage of the latest research on emotions in organizations, including 
emotional intelligence. 
It is in this context that the authors of the present article have developed their 
interest in emotional intelligence.  As a consequence, we see emotional intelligence 
neither as some new form of social intelligence, nor as a substitute for intellectual 
intelligence.  From our perspective, emotional intelligence is another tool that I/O 
psychologists and scholars of organizational behavior can use in their efforts to 
understand and to predict behavior.  In earlier articles on this topic (Ashkanasy & Daus, 
2002, Ashkanasy et al., 2002), we listed the following “safe” four-point summary of 
views on emotional intelligence: 
1. Emotional intelligence is distinct from, but positively related to other 
intelligences. 
2. Emotional intelligence is an individual difference, where some people are more 
endowed, and others are less so. 
3. Emotional intelligence develops over a person’s life span and can be enhanced 
through training. 
4. Emotional intelligence involves, at least in part, a person’s abilities effectively 
to identify and to perceive emotion (in self and others), as well as possession of 
the skills to understand and to manage those emotions successfully. 
(Ashkanasy & Daus, p. 83) 
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We see little reason to retreat from this position, although recent research has 
extended the applicability of the construct to more and more aspects of organizational 
behavior, as will be outlined in the following review article. 
The important message we have to researchers entering this field is to take care.  
They need to understand that emotional intelligence is defined in Mayer and Salovey 
(1997).  While research is sure to elaborate and to challenge this theory (e.g., see 
Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Ashton-James, 2003), this is the working model of emotional 
intelligence that must form the basis of serious research in emotional intelligence for the 
immediate future.  Moreover, researchers need to take time to read the emotions 
literature, so that they have a full understanding of the theoretical underpinning of 
emotional intelligence and of the role that emotions play in organizational settings in 
particular. 
In conclusion, we posit that emotional intelligence research will continue to be a 
central plank of organizational behavior research for the foreseeable future.  The study of 
emotions in organizations was for too long neglected, and the idea of an individual 
difference variable that focuses on emotional abilities, as reflected in the Mayer and 
Salovey (1997) model of emotional intelligence, is an entirely appropriate focus for 
researchers working in this field.  At the same time, we welcome the sort of vigorous 
debate that is manifested in the SIOP debates (De Nisi, 2003; Van Rooy, 2004) and in the 
present issue.  We see this activity as sign that the field of organizational behavior in 
general, and the study of emotions in organizations in particular, is flourishing. House, 
Shane, and Herold argued in 1996 that, “Rumors of the death of dispositional research are 
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vastly exaggerated” (p. 203).  We suggest that the same holds true in respect of emotional 
intelligence in organizational behavior research. 
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Footnotes 
                                                 
i Note that this number includes all journals, while Landy searched only empirical 
articles. 
